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FOREWORD: IS IT TIME FOR AN ABBREVIATED 
PREMARKET APPROVAL FOR MEDICAL DEVICES?                 
Brian P. Wallenfelt† 
This Symposium Issue of the William Mitchell Law Review 
focuses on recent developments in medical-device law.  The world 
of medical devices is expansive.1  It includes everyday items, such as 
toothbrushes2 and sunglasses,3 as well as more exotic items, such as 
snakebite kits.4  Its reach spans from items permanently implanted 
in patients, such as pacemakers,5 to those that are only briefly in 
contact with patients, such as scalpels.6  It also covers those objects 
that are never physically in contact with patients, such as surgical 
lamps.7 
Many elements of medical-device law are rapidly changing, a 
transformation which the articles that follow explore.  This 
 
      †    JD Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, May 2013; Executive 
Editor, William Mitchell Law Review, Volume 39, Issue 4.  I thank all of the 
authors of articles in this Symposium Issue and the members of the William 
Mitchell Law Review.  I also thank Professors David Prince, Lars Noah, and Greg 
Duhl for their ideas and help with this symposium and foreword.  Finally, I thank 
my wonderful wife and children for everything. 
 1.  A medical device is defined as “an instrument, apparatus, implement, 
machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related 
article,” which is “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, 
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other 
animals” or “intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or 
other animals” and, to exclude drugs and foods, “does not achieve its primary 
intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other 
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement 
of its primary intended purposes.”  21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006). 
 2.  21 C.F.R § 872.6855 (2012) (“Manual toothbrush”); Id. § 872.6865 
(“Powered toothbrush”). 
 3.  Id. § 886.5850. 
 4.  Id. § 872.5740. 
 5.  Id. § 870.3610; see also, e.g., id. § 872.3630 (“Endosseous dental implant”); 
id. § 872.4760 (“Bone plate”). 
 6.  Id. § 878.4800 (“Manual surgical instrument for general use”); see also, 
e.g., id. § 878.6265 (“Examination gloves”); id. § 880.2700 (“Stand-on patient 
scale”). 
 7.  Id. § 878.4580; see also, e.g., id. § 892.1750 (“Computed tomography X-ray 
system”); id. § 862.2860 (“Mass spectrometer for clinical use”). 
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foreword will briefly describe the history and framework of medical-
device law that underlie the discussions in many of these articles.  It 
also will briefly point out an area of medical-device law that is stuck 
in the 1970s and suggest a potential solution. 
Medical-device law came into its own with the enactment of 
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA),8 which, among 
other things, added a regulatory approval process for devices to the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).9  Before that, the 
regulation was uneven, with medical devices sometimes subjected 
to the federal approval process for drugs.10  For example, prior to 
the MDA, the United States Supreme Court held that a laboratory 
diagnostic—one that never touched nor was even in the same room 
as the patient—was a drug and therefore was subject to the drug 
approval process.11  This exemplified the non-standard definition of 
“drug” in the FDCA.  In addition to potentially being subjected to 
the federal drug approval process, medical devices were also 
subject to varied and potentially conflicting state-approval 
processes.12 
Congress attempted to clean up this morass by enacting the 
MDA.  First, the MDA says that no state “may establish or continue 
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any 
requirement” that is “different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement” of the MDA and “which relates to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device.”13  This broadly preempted state 
requirements and regulatory processes applicable to medical 
devices. 
Second, the MDA created a premarket approval (PMA) 
 
 8.  Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 9.  Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 331–397 (2006)). 
 10.  The definition of drug was (and still is) incredibly broad.  Subject to 
some exceptions, drugs are defined as “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; 
and . . . articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function 
of the body of man or other animals.”  21 U.S.C. § 360(g)(1)(b)–(c) (2006). 
 11.  See United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 
(1969). 
 12.  See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315–16 (2008) (noting that 
several states adopted approval processes in the seventies); see also id. at 342 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing “potentially conflicting state regulatory 
regimes”). 
 13.  21 U.S.C. §360k(a). 
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process for medical devices.14  The PMA process is quite time-
consuming and expensive to complete, requiring, among other 
things, information on the following: clinical investigations, 
principles of operation, and manufacturing facilities and controls.15  
The PMA process, however, is not applicable to all medical devices.  
Instead, devices are classified based on the level of controls 
required to ensure safety and effectiveness.16  And only those 
devices requiring the highest level of controls—Class III devices—
are subject to the PMA process.17 
There is one additional group of devices that are exempt from 
the PMA process: Class III devices that were already on the market 
at the time the MDA was enacted.18  The FDA may, however, 
override this default by regulation and require a PMA for even a 
pre-1976 device.19  In addition, to prevent pre-1976 devices from 
having a monopoly, a new device that is substantially equivalent to a 
pre-1976 device is not subject to the PMA process.20  Those 
substantially equivalent devices are typically subject to the less-
rigorous premarket notification process, which is also known as the 
510(k) process.21  Under the 510(k) process, a manufacturer 
notifies the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that it 
intends to introduce a new device, asserts that it is substantially 
equivalent to a pre-1976 device, and waits for an order from the 
FDA clearing the device.22 
This dual-approval path creates an odd dichotomy triggered 
off of a date that is nearly forty years old.  Most devices enter the 
market through the 510(k) process, which operates like the 
children’s game of telephone, in which a secret message is 
whispered from one child to the next.  The manufacturers of new 
devices assert substantial equivalence to a recently introduced 
device, the manufacturers of which had previously asserted 
substantial equivalence to a slightly older device, and so on until 
the chain reaches a device introduced prior to 1976.  And much 
 
 14.  Id. § 360e. 
 15.  See id. § 360e(c)(1)(A)–(C). 
 16.  See id. § 360c(a)–(d). 
 17.  Id. § 360e(a). 
 18.  Id. § 360c(f)(1)(A)(i)(I).  The FDA may, however, require a PMA for a 
pre-1976 device. 
 19.  See id. § 360e(b). 
 20.  Id. § 360c(f). 
 21.  Id. § 360(k).  Section 360(k) corresponds to section 510(k) of the FDCA. 
 22.  Id.; id. § 360(n). 
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like the message that the child at the end of the line hears, the new 
device may barely resemble the original one.  Nonetheless, the 
510(k) process works.  It fosters competition by allowing 
competitors to enter the market quickly.  It also fosters innovation 
and lower prices to end-users by allowing incremental 
improvements to devices without the added expense of the PMA 
process.  These benefits are all available, so long as the new device 
can be traced to a pre-1976 device for which the FDA has not 
required a PMA. 
But there are few shortcuts for competitors wishing to enter 
the market for a Class III device introduced after 1976.23  
Competitors typically may enter the market only after successfully 
completing the rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive PMA 
process.  The PMA process often creates a barrier to entry that 
allows the approved manufacturer to reap monopoly profits, much 
like the holder of a patent.  Accordingly, innovation and 
competition may be stifled when it comes to devices subject to the 
PMA process—specifically, those class III devices introduced after 
1976. 
A similar problem was addressed for pharmaceuticals in 1984 
with the Hatch-Waxman Act.24  Hatch-Waxman created a bargain of 
sorts.  It created the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) 
process that focuses on similarity to an already approved “pioneer” 
drug.25  It also created an exclusive period following the approval of 
a new drug during which an ANDA cannot be approved.26  This 
exclusive period serves to reward the manufacturer for bearing the 
heavy burden of research and development and the new drug 
regulatory process.  But after that exclusive period expires, 
competitors (i.e., generic drug manufacturers) may enter the 
market through the ANDA process without going through the time 
and expense of a new drug application.27  This has created a robust 
 
 23.  There are two potential shortcuts.  First, a manufacturer may petition the 
FDA to down-classify the device.  Id. § 360c(f)(2)–(3).  Second, a manufacturer 
may reference information (e.g., clinical trial data) in a PMA that was approved 
more than six years earlier.  Id. § 360j(h)(4). 
 24.  Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)). 
 25.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
 26.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(F).  The period of exclusivity for a pioneer drug is based 
on how different it is from previously approved drugs.  For example, a pioneer 
drug with an entirely new active ingredient will get five years of exclusivity, while 
one with a new use of a known ingredient will get fewer.  Id. 
 27.  Id. § 355(j)(1), (j)(2)(A)(vii). 
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and competitive generic-drug market.  It may be appropriate to 
enact a similar scheme for medical devices, which would make 
more sense than using an almost forty-year-old date to determine 
which regulatory process a device is subject to. 
Although this aspect of medical-device law is stuck in the past, 
many other aspects are rapidly changing and continuing to 
develop.  The articles in this Symposium Issue explore those 
changing areas of medical-device law. 
Three of the articles in this symposium, in part, explore the 
impact of the MDA’s preemption section28 on state tort law.  The 
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 
definitively interpreted that section, holding that state tort law is, 
for the most part, preempted for those devices—often the highest 
risk devices—that were approved through the PMA process.29  Since 
Riegel, plaintiffs have been forced to explore alternative theories by 
which to seek compensation for injuries caused by a PMA-approved 
medical device. 
In his article, Professor J. David Prince explores one route to 
avoid Riegel-preemption: pleading a parallel claim.30  A parallel 
claim is one in which the state requirement is the same as the 
federal requirement (i.e., it is not “different from, or in addition 
to”31 a federal requirement).  Such claims are not expressly 
preempted by the MDA.  His article explores recent decisions 
regarding parallel claims and articulates a test for recognizing a 
parallel claim.  A parallel claim, however, may be impliedly 
preempted under the standard articulated in Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ 
Legal Committee, in which the Court held that there was no private 
right of action under the FDCA.32  Professor Prince also surveys the 
cases that have attempted to toe the line between Buckman and 
Riegel.  And he discusses the pleadings challenges plaintiffs face 
when asserting a parallel claim given the lack of information 
available pre-discovery.  He concludes that “[t]he precise contours 
of the narrow gap through which a plaintiff bringing a product 
 
 28.  Id. § 360k(a) (“[N]o State . . . may establish or continue in effect with 
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement . . . which is different 
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the 
device, and which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device.”). 
 29.  See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 30.  J. David Prince, The Puzzle of Parallel Claims, Preemption, and Pleading the 
Particulars, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1034 (2013). 
 31.  21 U.S.C § 360k(a). 
 32.  531 U.S. 341, 349 n.4 (2001). 
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defect claim against a medical device manufacturer must sail in 
order to avoid having her claims preempted are not yet clear.”33 
In their article, practicing attorneys Christiana C. Jacxsens, 
Sara E. Deskins, and Sean P. Jessee discuss another tactic that 
plaintiffs have employed to get around Riegel: “Since the Riegel 
decision, plaintiffs have attempted to assert novel claims to avoid 
preemption by focusing on the alleged conduct of sales 
representatives.”34  Drawing on a wealth of practical experience, the 
trio explores the multitude of “avenues for sales representative 
liability”35 and the potential defenses that are available to such 
claims.  The authors also discuss the recent increase in government 
enforcement actions against sales personnel and civil products 
liability actions based on that government enforcement action. 
Practicing attorneys David T. Schultz and D. Scott Aberson 
discuss a third technique plaintiffs have attempted to use to avoid 
Riegel-preemption—arguing that the FDA “limited its premarket 
approval to only certain aspects or components of a particular 
medical device or system.”36  As their article explains, this (perhaps 
clever) argument, ultimately fails.  They discuss a number of cases 
involving PMA-approved devices that incorporate components that 
had previously been brought to market through the 510(k) 
process.  In these cases, the plaintiffs argued that the PMA and 
Riegel-preemption only applied to the components of the devices 
that had not previously been marketed using the 510(k) process.  
Sometimes, the plaintiffs even asked the FDA to clarify and narrow 
the approval letter.  In all cases, these petitions and these 
arguments have been rejected.  Accordingly, the authors conclude 
“there is simply no such thing as a limited PMA.”37 
Patent attorneys Suneel Arora, Timothy J. Christman, Ashley 
N. Mays, and Andrew Schmidt contribute an article about the 
intersection of patent law and the 510(k) process.38  They first 
 
 33.  Prince, supra note 30, at 1084. 
 34.  Christiana C. Jacxsens, Sara E. Deskins & Sean P. Jessee, Beyond the Basics: 
Expanding Theories of Liability and Defenses for Claims Involving Medical Device Sales 
Representatives, 39 WM. MITCHELL L.REV. 1087, 1089–90 (2013). 
 35.  Id. at 1088. 
 36.  David T. Schultz & D. Scott Aberson, Be Careful What You Ask For: The 
FDA’s Denials of Citizen Petitions Confirms There Is No Such Thing as a Limited Premarket 
Approval, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2013). 
 37.  Id. at 1159. 
 38.  Suneel Arora, Timothy J. Christman, Ashley N. Mays, PhD & Andrew 
Schmidt, The Interplay Between FDA and Patent Law: Infusing Organizational Knowledge 
for Medical Device Companies, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1176 (2013) 
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discuss the tension between patent law and the 510(k) process.  On 
the one hand, while seeking to introduce a new medical device via 
the 510(k) process, a manufacturer will assert that the device is 
substantially equivalent to a preexisting device.  But on the other 
hand, while seeking a patent on that same device, the 
manufacturer will claim that the same device is novel and non-
obvious.  Additionally, the authors discuss the impact of an 
assertion of substantial equivalence in a 510(k) notification on a 
defendant in a patent infringement lawsuit brought by the 
manufacturer of the predicate device.  The article provides 
practical advice on how to coordinate regulatory and patent 
submissions to address these challenges and emphasizes the 
importance of “[i]nfusing knowledge of the interplay between the 
patent and FDA processes.”39 
Dr. Bruce Patsner, a medical doctor and professor of law, 
surveys the landscape of direct-to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) of 
medical devices.40  He contrasts the DTCA of medical devices with 
the DTCA of pharmaceuticals.  In both cases, the FDA has 
developed extensive regulations relating to the DTCA by 
manufacturers.  In the pharmaceutical world, these regulations 
have been the subject of multiple First Amendment–based 
challenges.  Dr. Patsner explains that, unlike pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, medical device manufacturers rarely engage in 
DTCA.  Rather, it is hospitals and physicians that advertise medical 
devices to consumers.  He then evaluates these advertisements, 
finding that they often fall short of the regulations that would apply 
if the advertisements were from the manufacturer.  In some cases 
he finds that the advertisements are even false or misleading.  He 
concludes that in the context of medical device DTCA, “prevention 
of consumer fraud, not protection of the First Amendment rights 
of corporations against government encroachment, is where the 
battle line should be drawn.”41 
This Symposium Issue concludes with two dueling perspectives 
on deactivating implanted cardiac-assist devices.  First, Professor 
Lars Noah introduces the thorny issue of where the line is between 
a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment and physician-assisted 
 
 39.  Id. at 1206. 
 40.  Bruce Patsner, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Restricted, Surgically 
Implanted Medical Devices: What Does the Advertising Arena Look Like, and Whose 
Regulatory Problem Is It?, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1207 (2013). 
 41.  Id. at 1215. 
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suicide in the context of deactivating implanted cardiac-assist 
devices.42  He first discusses the growing use of implantable cardiac-
assist devices among the elderly and the potentially painful and 
traumatic end-of-life issues associated with these devices.  He then 
surveys the perspectives in the medical-ethics literature on this 
issue, and determines that medical ethics may inform, but does not 
answer the legal question.  He then looks for analogies in cases 
relating to withdrawal of treatment and physician-assisted suicide.  
Noting that medical devices straddle the lines between treatment, 
property, and self, he concludes that these cases fail to provide an 
adequate analogy for the deactivation of cardiac-assist devices and 
that, in order to eliminate the associated uncertainty, states should 
address this issue legislatively. 
In response, David Orentlicher, a medical doctor and 
professor of law, argues that in most cases a medical device is a 
form of treatment and that a patient has an unconditional right to 
refuse it or request its withdrawal.43  Prof. Orentlicher then 
describes a framework for evaluating the deactivation of implanted 
cardiac devices to distinguish between permissible withdrawal of 
treatment and euthanasia.  He concludes that only if a medical 
device were a complete and perfect replacement for an organ 
would it be impermissible euthanasia to disable the device.  Clearly, 
this debate will not be settled for some time.  But these two articles 
provide new perspectives that are sure to influence it. 
 
 
 42.  Lars Noah, Turn the Beat Around?: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-Assist 
Devices, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1229 (2013). 
 43.  David Orentlicher, Deactivating Implanted Cardiac Devices: Euthanasia or the 
Withdrawal of Treatment?, WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 1287 (2013). 
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